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AIRCRAFT PURCHASES: "LET THE BUYER
BEWARE!"
Working against the backdrop of a nebulous federal statute, con-
tradictory case law, and weighty policy considerations, the California
Supreme Court recently concluded in Dowell v. Beech Acceptance
Corp.' that one who purchases an aircraft from a dealer in the ordi-
nary course of business and fails to record his interest in the aircraft
with the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) cannot prevail over one
who has a prior federally recorded security interest in the same air-
craft.
There is an apparent conflict between California Commercial
Code section 9307 and certain provisions of the Federal Aviation
Act.2  The Commercial Code provides that the interests of the
buyer in the ordinary course of business are accorded priority against
third party security interests in the same goods, even though such se-
curity interests may have been recorded previously.' The federal
statutes, on the other hand, provide that any conveyance or instrument
affecting title to aircraft which is recorded with the Federal Aviation
Agency (FAA) shall "be valid as to all persons without further or
other recordation. 1
4
Although Dowell has settled this conflict regarding priorities of
aircraft interests in the state of California, the decision contributes to
a growing split of authority as to whether federal or state law deter-
mines priorities. In view of this continuing controversy, the California
Supreme Court's opinion may have an impact on the decisions of other
courts faced with the problem of determining priorities of interests
in aircraft. This note will analyze the court's decision in terms of the
1. 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct.
45 (1971).
2. § 503-06, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1403-06 (1970).
3. "The buyer in ordinary course of business is defined as one who buys 'in good
faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights
or security interest of a third party.' This Section provides that such a buyer takes
free of a security interest, even though perfected, and although he knows the security
interest exists. Reading the two provisions together, it results that the buyer takes
free if he merely knows that there is a security interest which covers the goods but
takes subject if he knows, in addition, that the sale is in violation of some term in the
security agreement not waived by the words or conduct of the secured party.
"The limitations which this Section imposes on the persons who may take free of a
security interest apply of course only to unauthorized sales by the debtor." UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-307, Comment 2.
4. Federal Aviation Act § 503(d), 49 U.S.C. § 1403(d) (1970).
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legislative intent behind the pertinent federal statutes and will discuss
some of the cases from other jurisdictions cited by the court. The dis-
cussion will indicate that the court's reliance on certain of these cases
in support of its decision may have been in error, and that some of the
policy considerations underlying the decision may have been misdi-
rected.
The Controversy in Dowell
In Dowell a Beech Bonanza aircraft was sold by the manufac-
turer to one of its distributors. On October 26, 1965, the distributor
delivered the plane to an authorized Beechcraft dealer. The dealer
and the distributor entered into a conditional sales contract which
provided that the dealer was not to sell the plane without the dis-
tributor's consent and that the distributor would retain a security in-
terest in the plane to the extent of the unpaid balance of the pur-
chase price. The distributor assigned its interest under the condi-
tional sales contract to defendant, a company in the business of air-
craft financing. On October 27, 1965, the finance company filed
the conditional sales contract and its assignment with the Federal Avia-
tion Agency and on November 4, 1965, the FAA recorded the in-
struments.5
In July of 1966, the plaintiff, Dowell, purchased the aircraft from
the dealer for $30,000, paying for it in full. At the time of the
purchase, the plaintiff had failed to inquire about the title of the
plane, even though it was subsequently established that he was a mem-
ber of the Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association and was aware that he
could have checked the title with the FAA for a $3.50 fee. The
plaintiff had left the bill of sale with the dealer who had promised
that he would file it with the FAA Aircraft Registry. However, the
dealer failed to do so.'
At the time of the purchase the dealer still owed more than
$20,000 on the plane, and normally the dealer should have paid the
assignee finance company from the proceeds of the sale. On Septem-
ber 22, 1966, the dealer advised the finance company that he had sold
the airplane and had failed to pay them. On September 23, 1966, act-
ing on advice of counsel, the finance company, the distributor, and
its parent corporation removed the plane from the plaintiff purchaser's
possession without his knowledge or consent.7 The purchaser then
brought an action to establish his title to the aircraft. The trial
court relying on California Commercial Code section 9307 awarded the
aircraft to the plaintiff purchaser together with compensatory and
5. 3 Cal. 3d at 546, 476 P.2d at 401-02, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 1-2.
6. Id. at 546, 476 P.2d at 402, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
7. Id. at 546-47, 476 P.2d at 402, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
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punitive damages. The court of appeal upheld the trial court in its
award of possession of the aircraft and the compensatory damages but
reversed as to the award of punitive damages.8 The California Su-
preme Court, in a unanimous opinion, reversed the court of appeal and
remanded the case to the trial court with directions to enter judgment
for the finance company on the basis of the priority of its recorded
security interest in the aircraft.' Before the supreme court the plain-
tiff contended he was entitled to prevail under section 9307 of the
California Commercial Code which provides that
[a] buyer in ordinary course of business . . . takes free of a se-
curity interest created by his seller even though the security inter-
est is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence. 10
The finance company, on the other hand, contended its recorded se-
curity interest in the aircraft was superior to any interest of the plain-
tiff by virtue of the recording provisions of the Federal Aviation Act.
Section 503 of that act" provides for the establishment and mainte-
nance of a system for the recording of any conveyance or instru-
ment executed for security purposes which affects the title to, or any
interest in, any civil aircraft of the United States. Of particular rele-
vance to the issue in Dowell are subsections (c) and (d) which pro-
vide:
(c) No conveyance or instrument the recording of which is
provided for by subsection (a) [requiring recordation of all instru-
ments affecting title to aircraft] of this section shall be valid
. . . against any person other than the person by whom the con-
veyance or other instrument is made or given, his heir or devisee,
or any person having actual notice thereof, until such conveyance
or other instrument is filed for recordation in the office of the
Secretary of Transportation ...
(d) Each conveyance or other instrument recorded by
means of or under the system provided for in . . . this section
shall from the time of its filing for recordation be valid as to all
persons without further or other recordation .... 12
Section 506 provides:
The validity of any instrument the recording of which is pro-
vided for by section 1403 of this title shall be governed by the
laws of the State . . . in which such instrument is delivered, ir-
respective of the location or the place of delivery of the property
which is the subject of such instrument. 13
8. Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 84 Cal. Rptr. 654, 664 (Ct. App.), va-
cated, 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
9. 3 Cal. 3d at 552, 476 P.2d at 406, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
10. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9307 (West 1964).
11. 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970).
12. Federal Aviation Act H§ 503(c), (d), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1403(c), (d) (1970)
(emphasis added).
13. Id. § 506, 49 U.S.C. § 1406 (1970) (emphasis added).
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At the outset, it will be seen that the terms "valid" and "validity" in the
federal statutes are used in at least two different senses.1 4 On initial
examination, subsections (c) and (d) of section 503 and section 506
appear contradictory. Subsections (c) and (d) of section 503 provide
that, except as to certain persons, the validity of an instrument af-
fecting any interest in an aircraft will be governed by federal recorda-
tion requirements. Section 506 provides that the validity of the in-
strument will be governed by laws of the state where the instrument is
delivered. The recordation provisions seem to be silent on the ques-
tion of priorities.
The courts are in conflict as to the intent of Congress in pro-
viding that a conveyance or other instrument, upon filing for re-
cordation, "shall be valid as to all persons without further or other
recordation." Some courts have taken the position that this lan-
guage was clearly intended to establish a set of priorities under federal
law."5 Other courts, however, have equated the term valid which
appears in the federal statute with the term perfected as it has been
interpreted under the Uniform Commercial Code. 6 The latter courts
have taken the position that the recordation provisions of the Federal
Aviation Act simply establish the means by which a security interest
affecting title to an aircraft can be perfected. Under this view, ques-
tions of priorities must still be addressed to applicable state laws.'
7
Most courts, however, have agreed that the term "validity" referred to
in section 506 is "initial or inherent validity" of the instrument irre-
spective of the question of priorities.' 8
14. For an indication of the myriad denotations of these terms in legal parlance
see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1719-20 (4th ed. 1951).
15. See, e.g., In re Veterans' Air Express Co., 76 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1948).
16. "Perfection ...is a Code term of art which describes the rights a secured
party has in collateral and regulates those rights as they may come into contact or
conflict with the rights of third persons, such as buyers from or judgment creditors of,
the debtor.
"Perfection, as used in Article 9, in effect, means the greatest bundle of rights,
with respect to personal property, which it is possible for a party to obtain under the
law of secured transactions ...
"It should be observed, however, that perfection does not necessarily mean that the
secured party has rights which are absolutely supreme and therefore entitle him to a
position ahead of all persons. Even though a security interest is a perfected one, the
secured party's interest may still be subordinate to the rights and claims of certain
third parties." 0. SpiVACK, SECURED TRNSACTONS 33-34 (3d ed. 1963).
17. See, e.g., Northern Ill. Corp. v. Bishop Distrib. Co., 284 F. Supp. 121 (W.D.
Mich. 1968).
18. See, e.g., Texas Nat'l Bank v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599, 603 (E.D.
Ark. 1964): "On the other hand, compliance with section 1403 does not validate a
conveyance or other instrument which is lacking in initial or inherent validity as a
contract document between the original parties, as, for example, a mortgage or convey-
ance obtained by fraud or without consideration, or executed by an incompetent
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Legislative History of the Federal
Recording Provisions
The substance of the recording provisions has remained virtually
unchanged since they were originally enacted in 1938 as part of the
Civil Aeronautics Act and subsequently incorporated in Section 503
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. The stated objective of Congress
in enacting the recording provisions was to provide a central record-
ing system for interests affecting title to aircraft. 19 The absence of a
central recording system has created difficulties regarding title owner-
ship, because a person holding an interest in an aircraft could have
it recorded in any jurisdiction where the aircraft was located.2 0  As a
result, a prospective purchaser or lienor would be required to make a
search of the records in every jurisdiction where the plane may have ever
been located in order to determine the status of the title in a particular
aircraft. Given the great mobility of aircraft, such a task would be
monumental, and the recording provisions were therefore designed to
establish a central recording agency to ease the task of discovering any
asserted claims to a particular aircraft. 2 '
There is no indication in the legislative history accompanying the
enactment of the original provisions in the 1938 Act that the record-
ing provisions were intended by Congress to supersede priorities es-
tablished under various state laws. 2 2 In fact there is strong evidence
of a contrary intent. As originally introduced by Senator McCarran,
the proposed recording statute provided: "Every instrument so re-
corded shall have priority over all other claims arising after July 9,
1939, against the aircraft subject thereto. '2 3  The fact that this lan-
guage was deleted from the amendment adopted by the Senate 2 is in-
dicative of a congressional reluctance to establish a set of priorities
under federal law.
Stronger evidence that it was not the intent of Congress to nullify
state laws concerning priorities of security interests may be found in
the legislative history of section 506. In 1963, Representative John
Lindsay of New York introduced H.R. 2522 which provided in part:
party. . . . In the Court's estimation the validity about which Congress was talking in
the 1964 Act [49 U.S.C. § 1406 (1970)] is what the Court has referred to as the
initial or inherent validity of the instrument in question."
19. Hearings on H.R. 9738 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 405-07 (1938). See also Scott, Liens in Aircraft:
Priorities, 25 J. Am L. & COM. 193, 203 (1958).
20. Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 84 Cal. Rptr. 654, 658 (Ct. App.),
vacated, 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
21. Hearings, supra note 19, at 405-07.
22. Id.
23. S. 3845, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. § 502(d) (1938) (emphasis added).
24. 83 CONG. REC. 6757 (1938).
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Any conveyance, lease, mortgage, equipment trust, contract of
conditional sale, or other instrument ... which affects the
title to, or any interest in, any aircraft, . . .which is valid as
against the parties thereto ... under the laws of that State
... in which such conveyance or other instrument is delivered,
shall, upon the filing of such conveyance or other instrument for
recordation ...be valid, in respect of the title or interest so
transferred or created, as against all creditors, subsequent pur-
chasers, encumbrancers, or other persons .... 25
On June 18, 1963, hearings on this bill were held before the Sub-
committee on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Commit-
tee of Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Mr. Lindsay stated that the
purpose of his bill was to provide a statutory choice of law for deter-mining the formal validity of instruments tendered for recording by the
FAA.26  Early in the hearing, Congressman Springer expressed con-
cem over the emphasized language of the bill. He and other repre-
sentatives repeatedly questioned Mr. Hill, Deputy General Counsel of
the FAA, and Mr. Calligar, a New York attorney experienced in rep-
resenting aircraft financing companies, about their interpretation of
the proposed legislation. In response to questions from Congressman
Springer, Mr. Hill stated that the bill was directed solely to the ques-
tion of validity as against other creditors and not the question of pri-
ority as against other creditors.2  When asked by Congressman
Springer for his interpretation of the language in the proposed bill,
Mr. Calligar also replied that the "provision does not go to priority as
to creditors or lienors. . . . Priorities and precedents are under
other bodies of law not involved with this legislation at all."'2 8  Later
in the hearing, Representative Hemphill asked Mr. Hill whether the
provision foreclosed subsequent creditors and purchasers from attack-
ing lien priorities. Mr. Hill again stated that it did not.
29
A particularly significant interchange, in view of the subsequent
history of section 506, took place between Representative Springer
and Mr. Seybold, Vice President, Federal Affairs, Air Transport As-
sociation. Mr. Springer stated that in his view the provision was at-
25. H.R. 2522, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (emphasis added).
26. Hearing on H.R. 2522 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Aero-
nautics of the House Comm. of Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1963) (emphasis added). See also S. REP. No. 1060, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 (1964). In attempting to resolve the issue as to which jurisdiction's laws should
apply in determining such an instrument's validity, it is arguable that the law of one of
the three following jurisdictions is applicable: The jurisdiction in which the property
is located; the jurisdiction in which the parties reside; or the jurisdiction in which the
instrument was executed and delivered. The bill selects the place where the instrument
is delivered.
27. Hearing, supra note 26, at 25.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 26.
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tempting to establish not only the validity of the recorded security in-
terest but its priority as well. Mr. Seybold stated that the primary
interest of the bill was only to clarify which state's law should be ap-
plied to the interpretation of the instrument. Mr. Springer retorted,
"If that is as far as you are going, may we get some language which
says just that and nothing more."30 Aparently, Congressman
Springer had his way because H.R. 2522 died in committee. Later in
the year, Mr. Lindsay introduced another bill-H.R. 8673-which was
subsequently enacted as section 506. It is noteworthy that the pro-
vision which was enacted does not contain the language regarding re-
spective priorities of recorded instruments that had troubled Congress-
man Springer.
Review of the records of the congressional hearings indicates that
both the congressmen and the expert witnesses tacitly assumed that
the federal recordation provisions then in effect [section 503] did not
alter the determination of priorities under state laws. Moreover, it
also seems clear that the congressmen were opposed to any language
which might be interpreted as delineating a set of priorities inconsist-
ent with the state law normally applicable.
In light of this legislative history which was amply explored in
the court of appeal decision, one may question why the California
Supreme Court should have taken the position that prior recorded in-
terests under federal law should take precedence over subsequent pur-
chasers who would have prevailed under state law. The justification
for this position appears to have been largely a matter of judicial pol-
icy.
Policy Considerations
The basis of the Dowell decision is what the California Supreme
Court denominates the "federal policy" to protect previously acquired
property interests in aircraft.
We would undermine any federal policy requiring recordation to
protect previously acquired aircraft titles if we held that state law
governed the rights of the parties irrespective of recordation.
31
The existence of such a "federal policy" appears to be premised by
the court on the purposes of Congress in creating a federal recorda-
tion system-to bring order to the field of aircraft titles and to protect
holders of substantial property interests in aircraft. In the view of
the California Supreme Court:
Neither of those purposes is served if we apply state law in a
manner virtually ignoring the existence of the federal system. If
prior recorded interests are not protected against subsequent buy-
30. Id. at 32.
31. 3 Cal. 3d at 549, 476 P.2d at 404, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 4 (emphasis added).
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ers who fail to search title, the federal policy in favor of the
recordation of aircraft titles will be frustrated and subsequent
purchasers in California will cavalierly decline to investigate




While it is true that one of the purposes of the federal recording
system was to protect substantial property interests in aircraft, it is
perhaps somewhat of an overstatement to translate this purpose as a
"federal policy" aimed at protecting previously acquired interests. The
argument can be made that there is an equally strong federal policy
inherent in the federal statutes protecting subsequently acquired inter-
ests. The latter view may be supported by statements in the hearings
of the 1938 act which indicate that the recording provisions were de-
signed to protect private purchasers as against prior interest holders
whose claims were difficult to ascertain. 3  Although the California
Supreme Court noted that there may be conflicting policy considera-
tions, such matters were deemed subordinate to the "overriding fed-
eral policy" to protect previously recorded interests.34 As has previ-
ously been discussed, Congress did not intend the enactment of the
recording provisions to establish a set of priorities under federal law.
However, the California Supreme Court avoided discussion of the leg-
islative history which had been set out in some detail in the lower
court opinion,3 5 and appears to have been swayed by the arguments
advanced by the defendant finance company.
The defendant finance company contended on appeal that if the
recorded security interest was not given priority over unrecorded in-
terests, the impact on the aircraft financing industry would be devas-
tating.
If the protection of the federal recordation laws is thus emascu-
lated, the financing of aircraft will be left in a state of chaos.
Lenders will no longer lend in the event their security interest,
properly recorded, may be defeated by a subseauent purchaser
with constructive notice of their interest.3
6
Even though it appears certain that Congress did not intend to
establish any system of priorities under the recording statutes, it is
32. Id. at 550-51, 476 P.2d at 405, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
33. Hearing on H.R. 9738 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 406 (1938). See note 36 infra.
34. "[We do not overlook those few cases reaching a contrary conclusion....
While the view espoused in those cases has appeal from a policy perspective, it ig-
nores the impact of the overriding federal policy in section 1403." 3 Cal. 3d at 552,
476 P.2d at 405-06, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5-6.
35. 84 Cal. Rptr. 654, 658-60 (Ct. App.), vacated, 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401,
91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
36. Defendant's Petition for Hearing at 7, Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp.,
3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
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equally certain that one of the purposes for providing a central re-
cording system with respect to interests in aircraft was to foster and
encourage the aircraft financing industry.37 This purpose was made
particularly clear in the enactment of section 506 which was primarily
designed by Congress to relieve aircraft financers of the burden of
drafting security agreements to conform with the formal requirements
for validity of all the possible jurisdictions in which the instrument
might have been interpreted."'
At this point, it may be worthwhile to note the policy considera-
tions underlying California Commercial Code section 9307 which is
patterned after the Uniform Commercial Code section 9-307. The
purpose of this section has been explained as protecting secured par-
ties only to the extent that the normal flow of commerce will not be
-unduly hindered or impaired. 39  The drafters of the Code apparently
adopt the attitude that dishonest action of the debtor is a credit risk,
and that the buyer of goods in the ordinary course of business is to be
protected as against the secured party who has taken that risk.4" The
effect of this policy is to allocate the burden of caution to the party
best equipped to investigate the reputation and reliability of the re-
tailer-generally a finance company which has advanced funds on the
37. As stated by Fred D. Fagg, Jr., Director of Air Commerce, U.S. Department
of Commerce, the purpose of the recording provisions was to protect both the aircraft
financing industry and private purchasers of aircraft: "[Existing systems of recordation
have] long been felt to be unsatisfactory particularly when the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation began to make loans, they felt that there should be some protection, and
many private owners have long felt that there should be some agency of the govern-
ment wherein any interest in aircraft could be recorded for their own protection because
a buyer of a private airplane is up against a problem far worse than that of the pur-
chaser . . . of an automobile, because aircraft can be moved so rapidly from State to
State that State recording laws in their individual differences have worked a hardship
on the buyer rather than really aided him." Hearing on H.R. 9738, Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 406 (1938).
38. "The purpose of the bill is directed toward the unnecessary ambiguity,
complexity, and time-consuming procedures involved in determining the validity of air-
craft conveyances. Passage of this measure will minimize these problems and greatly
facilitate the ease by which aircraft can be financed." S. REP. No. 1060, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1964).
39. Project, California Chattel Security and Article Nine of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 806, 898 (1961).
40. See also, 0. SPIVACK, SECURED TRANSACTIONS 11 (3d ed. 1963): "[I]nasmuch
as it is contemplated that inventory, by its very nature, will be disposed of in the
ordinary course of the retailer-mortgagor's business, there is the problem of a conflict
between the mortgagee and the retail buyer of the inventory. It should be obvious
that to resolve such conflict in any way other than but to affirm the title of the buyer
would be unjust and would lead to the impossible requirement that a retail buyer is
under a duty to investigate the title of a merchant from whom he buys. The courts
would not permit one who acquiesced in the offering of his collateral for sale to enjoy
the benefits of a chattel mortgagee as against the retail customer of a merchant."
[Vol. 23
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basis of a security interest in the goods retained for sale by the re-
tailer. At a time when national attention has been focused on the
protection of the consumer and when even such ancient legal doc-
trines as the holder in due course are under bitter attack, the im-
portance of such a policy is not to be taken lightly.
However, it must also be frankly recognized that if the policy of
the Code prevails and purchasers in the ordinary course of business are
accorded priority, the burden on the aircraft financing industry is
heavy indeed.41 Aside from thorough investigation of the reputation
and credit references of the retail dealer, the financing company can
do little to protect itself against a dishonest dealer. The device of the
periodic inventory check is, for obvious reasons, of little avail to the
financer. Since aircraft are so highly mobile, it is a simple matter
for the retailer to falsely state that the aircraft is "out on demonstra-
tion" or to offer some other plausible excuse for its absence from the
inventory.
Yet the burden which would be placed on the aircraft financing
industry under the stated policy of the Uniform Commercial Code
must be carefully weighed against the burden which is placed on pri-
vate purchasers of goods in the market place under the policy enun-
ciated by the supreme court in Dowell. Admittedly an airplane is a
much more expensive chattel than that normally within the purview
of the Uniform Commercial Code. However, within the past decade,
light aircraft, such as that purchased by plaintiff in Dowell, have come
within the budgetary reach of many private persons of only moderate
wealth, and of small businesses interested in expanding their trade.
The policy rationale of the California Supreme Court is 'particularly
open to question in the case of the small business, which by virtue of
the decision in Dowel!, now must assume the risk of the loss of a large
capital investment because of misplaced confidence in a dishonest or
insolvent retailer. The average purchaser relies heavily on the good
faith of the aircraft dealer; the "customary practice is for the dealer,
or whoever is selling the aircraft, to record the bill of sale with F.A.A.
by sending it in on behalf of the purchaser."4  Given the generally
prevailing policy of the code in retail transactions, most individual
purchasers will be taken unaware by the exception carved out by the
supreme court for purchases of aircraft. Reasoning by analogy to
other purchases, the layman will rarely feel it necessary to search the
title in the aircraft he wants to buy. For example, the plaintiff in
Dowell apparently did not consider the need to determine title when
41. For an excellent, if slightly outdated, discussion of problem areas in aircraft
financing see Scott, Liens in Aircraft: Priorities, 25 J. Am LAw & CoM. 193 (1958).
42. Lochhead v. G.A.C. Fin. Corp., 6 Ariz. App. 539, 540, 434 P.2d 655, 656
(1967).
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he purchased his aircraft for $30,000 in cash from the dealer. Even
though he knew he could search title through the FAA, his stated
reason for failing to do so was
In my lifetime I have purchased 25 cars from General Motors,
from authorized franchised dealers, and never questioned their
ability to, or legal right to sell me that automobile or worry about
General Motors coming and stealing it out of my garage. 43
In view of the average purchaser's customary reliance on the
good faith of the dealer whose reputation he is ill-equipped to in-
vestigate, the better policy would appear to be that of the commercial
code which favors the purchaser over the financier. If the risk of loss
is placed on the financing industry rather than on the buyer, it may
be expected that finance companies will lend only to reliable dealers,
thus discouraging persons of dubious reputation or questionable eco-
nomic stability from becoming dealers in aircraft. Even assuming,
however, that the cumulative impact of decisions such as Dowell is
to make all prospective purchasers of aircraft wary enough to search
title before buying, it may be questioned whether the policy enunciated
in Dowell will favor aircraft financing. This point was raised in the
following excerpt from the plaintiff's petition for rehearing:
The buyer sees the plane on the showroom floor and decides to
buy it. However, the dealer cannot convey title until he pays the
lender who is in the business of financing aircraft for retail deal-
ers. The retailer cannot pay the lender until the buyer pays him,
otherwise he would not have had to finance the plane in the first
place. The buyer will not pay the purchase price until he gets
good title. The lender will not convey his security interest until
he receives his money from the dealer who cannot pay the
money until he gets it from the buyer. Thus, an impasse is
reached. The buyer gets tired of this Alphonse-Gaston comedy
and goes elsewhere to purchase the plane. Surely the retailer
would be unhappy with such a result. Also, if the retailer can't
sell the plane, the lender will soon lose his profitable business of
financing planes for retailers. 44
Although the situation in plaintiff's hypothetical case is exagger-
ated, the example does offer the suggestion that establishing the prior-
ity of interests recorded with the FAA to the possible detriment of
43. Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 84 Cal. Rptr. 654, 655 (Ct. App.), va-
cated, 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
"The argument often advanced for federal pre-emption of state interests-uniform
law involving interests of national importance-is untenable, since state law through-
out the nation is already uniform under the Uniform Commercial Code. Indeed, if
section 1403 is interpreted as preempting state law, the law regarding security interests
in goods is made less consistent by establishing special priorities applying only to air-
craft." Anderson, Federal Preemption, 37 J. AIR L. & COMM. 252, 259 (1971).
44. Plaintiffs Petition for Rehearing at 6, Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp.,
3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23
AIRCRAFt PURCHASES
other interests established under state law may not, in the end, have
the beneficial results intended by Congress-fostering and encourag-
ing aircraft financing. In view of the modem emphasis on buyer pro-
tection, the policy favoring the purchaser in the ordinary course of
business appears to outweigh the policy favoring the prior recorded
interest of the finance company. Fortunately, there have been courts
which have espoused this position. The conflict in policies has led to
a corresponding conflict of authority in the various jurisdictions which
have considered the question of priorities in aircraft liens.
Priorities Given Interests in Aircraft-
Other Jurisdictions
Although the decisions in the various jurisdictions are based on
divergent lines of reasoning, most have their genesis in a New Jersey
case decided in 1948, In re Veterans' Air Express Co.,45 which involved
the respective priorities of a prior recorded mortgage and a subse-
quent mechanic's lien. In Veterans' Express the parties placed in issue
the constitutionality of the federal recording provisions. The New
Jersey federal district court accorded priority to the government's in-
terest on two grounds: (1) Congress had pre-empted the entire field
of aircraft conveyances,4 I and (2) sovereign immunity. The rea-
soning of the court in Veterans' Express has been assailed by other
courts48 and criticized by commentators. 49  Despite such criticism,
45. 76 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1948).
46. "It is clear that the Congress has prescribed the only way in which aircraft
may be transferred and in which liens upon aircraft may be duly recorded. In this
manner, all persons dealing with aircraft are upon full legal notice concerning possible
liens and are charged with the duty of inquiry at the central recording office of the
Civil Aeronautics Administration with respect to any aircraft in which they might be
concerned." Id. at 688.
47. "Federal statutes may declare liens in favor of the Government nad [sic] es-
tablish their priority over subsequent purchasers or lienors irrespective of state re-
cording acts." Id. at 690.
48. E.g., Aircraft Inv. Corp. v. Pezzani & Reid Equip. Co., 205 F. Supp. 80,
82 (E.D. Mich. 1962); American Aviation, Inc. v. Aviation Ins. Managers, Inc.,
244 Ark. 829, 833-34, 427 S.W.2d 544, 547 (1968).
49. "Significant to this holding, however, is the fact that the mortgagee here in
the case was the United States government. The court appeared to place considerable
emphasis upon its conception of the high position of government liens and indeed, to
the extent that the mortgagee is a federal agency, equated passage of the recordation
statute with establishment of priority for the recording party.
"While the court is undoubtedly correct that Congress may establish the priority
of its liens with respect to liens asserted by private individuals under state statutes
or by virtue of common law, one may seriously question whether it intended to do so
in this instance. The purpose of the statute was reportedly to eliminate confusion
engendered by a multitude of state recording systems by providing a single basis for
constructive notice, not to establish the priority of a recorded security interest over
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however, the decision has had a large impact upon the law in this
area and the opinion is widely cited, even in decisions taking a con-
trary position on the question of priority.5" Although Veterans' Ex-
press is still good law with regard to the constitutional validity of the
federal recording provisions, subsequent decisions, particularly in
New Jersey, have construed Veterans' Express so as to limit the hold-
ing to the issue of constitutionality, exclusive of the issue of priorities.
The judicial penchant for quoting the language of pre-emption used
in Veterans' Express, however, has tended to obscure the fact that
many of the decisions having to do with the federal act do not view
recordation as creating affirmative priority as against competing rights
declared under applicable state law.
An examination of the cases decided after Veterans' Express re-
veals at least four distinct theories followed by the courts in the resolu-
tion of the question of priorities in aircraft claims. The four theories
will, for purposes of discussion, be denominated as follows: The
Constructive Notice Theory, The Validity Theory, The Actual Notice
Theory, and The State Law Theory.
The Constructive Notice Theory
The cases grouped under this heading are those which most
clearly support the decision in Dowell. Under this theory the under-
lying policy of the courts is to protect prior recorded interests in
aircraft; the view taken is essentially that, with respect to the recorda-
tion of such interests, the first in time is the first in right. Veterans'
Express established the origins of this theory.
It is clear that Congress has prescribed the only way in
which aircraft may be transferred and in which liens upon aircraft
may be duly recorded. In this manner, all persons dealing
with aircraft are upon full legal notice concerning possible liens
and are charged with the duty of inquiry at the central recording
office of the Civil Aeronautics Administration with respect to any
aircraft in which they might be concerned. 51
This language makes it virtually axiomatic that recordation assures
priority over subsequent lienors, even though the subsequent interests
all subsequent claims. The only situation in which priority appears to be determined
by the operation of the statute is where the security holder has failed to record his
interest. Such failure invalidates the conveyance as to innocent third persons. But
recordation itself merely validates; it does not grant priority. Certainly there is much
respectable authority in this country preferring the lien of the artisan to that of the
antecedent holder of a recorded security, either on a theory of implied consent or
agency. There is no indication that Congress intended to overrule such authority.
. Scott, Liens in Aircraft: Priorities, 25 J. AIR L. & COM. 193, 203 (1958).
50. E.g., Texas Nat'l Bank v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599, 603 (E.D. Ark.
1964).
51. 76 F. Supp. at 688 (emphasis added).
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are also recorded with the FAA. Under a strict construction of the
emphasized language the argument can be made that a purchaser who
is placed upon "full legal notice" by the recordation of a security
agreement with the FAA, must necessarily be on notice that the sale to
him is in violation of some term in the security agreement.52 There-
fore, unless the secured interest has been waived by the words or
conduct of the secured party," the purchaser is not a "buyer in ordi-
nary course of business" as this term is used in Uniform Commer-
cial Code section 9-307.54 This approach would strip the buyer of
any defense except that of waiver and virtually assures that a well-
drafted, duly recorded, prior security agreement will prevail over the
interest of a subsequent purchaser, regardless of whether the buyer
has or has not recorded his bill of sale with the FAA.
The New Jersey courts, as will be discussed later, have not fol-
lowed this line of reasoning-at least with respect to subsequent
mechanic's liens which would also be accorded priority over a recorded
security interest under Uniform Commercial Code section 9-310.-5
Aside from California, the only other jurisdiction which has followed
the constructive notice theory is Georgia in Dawson v. General Dis-
count Corp.56 In that case the mortgagee, who had acquired and re-
corded his security interest while the aircraft was in the possession of
the conditional buyer, brought suit to recover the aircraft from a subse-
quent purchaser who had failed to search title before his purchase.
The facts of this case are not clear enough to determine whether or
not the purchaser had made any attempt to record his purchase with
the FAA. Affirming a judgment for the mortgagee, the Georgia Ap-
pellate Court concluded:
[C]onstructive notice was given by the recording of the instru-
ment ...under the provisions of Title 49, U.S.C.A. [§ 1403],
which provides that every conveyance so recorded shall be valid
as to all persons. No further act was required of the plaintiff to
protect his rights. The defendant, before purchasing, had the
opportunity to ascertain the paramount outstanding title by check-
ing the records of the Civil Aeronautics Authority.
57
By describing the outstanding title as paramount, the court implies
that prior recordation with the FAA accords superiority. Although the
language of the opinion is not as strong as that of Veterans' Express
since the defendant was not "charged with the duty of inquiry,""8 the
52. UNIFORm COmmERCLAL CODE § 9-307, Comment 2.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. UNmoim COmmcIAL CODE § 9-310.
56. 82 Ga. App. 29, 60 S.E.2d 653 (1950).
57. Id. at 35, 60 S.E.2d at 658 (emphasis added).
58. 76 F. Supp. at 688.
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court's emphasis on the opportunity to ascertain outstanding title and
the implication of constructive notice has a similar effect of stripping
the buyer of the defense under Uniform Commercial Code section 9-307
of lack of knowledge that his purchase was in violation of a term of
the security agreement.5 9 Again, prior recordation with the FAA ac-
cords priority to such recorded interests over all subsequently ac-
quired interests, whether recorded or not, except in the case of waiver
of such priority.
The Validity Theory
Under the validity theory, recordation becomes a prerequisite to
the assertion of priority. Courts following this theory view the federal
recordation requirement as a prerequisite to the validity of the interest
asserted in the aircraft. Under this line of reasoning, an unrecorded
interest is invalid as to third parties without knowledge of such interest
and is automatically defeated by any prior or subsequent recorded
interest. However, none of the cases decided under this theory re-
solves the question of which law determines priorities between duly
recorded interests. Unlike the cases categorized under the construc-
tive notice theory, this group of cases does not tend to assure priority to
the first federally recorded interest by charging the buyer with a duty
of inquiry. Although the effect of the decisions is to accord priority to
recorded liens over unrecorded liens, it is not the priority but the
validity of the unrecorded lien that is placed in issue. Under the va-
lidity theory, it is possible that a buyer in ordinary course who filed his
bill of sale with the FAA might prevail over a prior recorded se-
curity interest by application of Uniform Commercial Code section
9-307. The mere failure to so record, however, would automatically
defeat the buyer's interest. Since the basis for the decision in Dowell
was not the plaintiff's failure to record, it is suggested that this body of
case law offers, at best, tenuous support for the reasoning of the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court.
A good example of the application of the validity theory is the
Indiana case of Crescent City Aviation, Inc. v. Beverly Bank. 0 In
this case the defendant bank provided the funds for the purchase of an
aircraft and held the installment sales contract and title to the aircraft
which had been duly recorded with the FAA as a security for the loan.
Some three months after the sale of the airplane, the plaintiff installed
a new engine in the plane and performed services and furnished ma-
terials in connection with its maintenance and operation. When the
amount due the plaintiff for his work remained unsatisfied, a notice of
59. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-307, Comment 2.
60. 139 Ind. App. 669, 219 N.E.2d 446 (1966).
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a mechanic's lien was filed with a local recorder but was not recorded
with the FAA. The Indiana court accorded priority to the bank on the
grounds that no lien affecting aircraft can be asserted until recorded
with the FAA.
[W]e are of the opinion that any lien affecting aircraft will not be
effective against the property of third persons without knowledge
unless and until the lien is recorded with the [FAA]. The va-
lidity of the lien or of any conveyance within the purview of the
FAA is a question to be determined by applying the law of the
jurisdiction where the instrument is delivered. But there is no
question of validity or for construction of the instrument that can
be determined until the lien is filed under the Federal Act.
. . . Such filing becomes in essence a condition precedent to
invoking the statutory or common law lien in cases such as is pre-
sented here.
61
Of course, the court did not consider the issue of priorities in
this case, since recordation was the sine qua non of raising the issue
in the first place. Assuming that the "condition precedent" of recor-
dation with the FAA is fulfilled, it is possible that the statutory or
common law lien will prevail over a previously recorded security
interest.
New Jersey originally followed the validity theory, but the case62
involving this line of reasoning was subsequently overruled in 1970.
However, for purposes of presenting the validity theory, the prior case
is presented here. In Smith v. Eastern Airmotive Corp.,63 *which in-
volved a fact situation similar to that faced by the Indiana court in
Crescent City, the New Jersey court declined to accord priority to a
mechanic's lien which had not been recorded with the FAA over a
security interest which had been so recorded. Under section 9-310 of
the Uniform Commercial Code which had been adopted by New Jer-
sey,64 the mechanic's lien would have had express priority over the se-
curity interest. However, the court refused to grant such priority on
the sole ground that the mechanic's lien was unrecorded with the
FAA.65 Again, the decision does not really reach the question of
priorities:
The facts in this case do not require consideration nor disposition
of the question of whether a federally recorded aircraft mechanic's
• . . lien would take priority over a previously federally recorded
security interest. 66
61. Id. at 673-74, 219 N.E.2d at 449.
62. Early in 1970 the Smith case was expressly overruled by Southern Jersey
Airways, Inc. v. National Bank, 108 N.J. Super. 369, 391, 261 A.2d 399, 411 (App.
Div. 1970). Southern Jersey is not cited in Dowell.
63. 99 N.J. Super. 340, 240 A.2d 17 (Ch. 1968).
64. The decision was based also on another New Jersey statute. NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:44-2 (1952).
65. 99 N.J. Super at 353-54, 240 A.2d at 25.
66. Id. at 353, 240 A.2d at 25.
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Florida also appears to have followed the validity theory in
James Talcott, Inc. v. Bank of Miami Beach.6 7 In that case the plain-
tiff had acquired a mortgage on an aircraft one day before a previous
mortgage held by the bank was recorded with the FAA. The court
held that until recordation with the FAA, neither the bank's mort-
gage nor the plaintiff's mortgage were valid with respect to each other,
as neither party had notice of the other's lien. However, since the
bank's mortgage was recorded with the FAA, it became valid and ef-
fective upon recordation, thus establishing its priority. One may ques-
tion whether the result in this case would have been any different
absent the federal recording provisions, since the plaintiff did not rely
upon any state law which might have accorded him priority. Thus the
Talcott case is of less significance in its resolution of the question of
priorities than in its reiteration of the principle that no lien may be
valid with respect to any other interest taken without notice, unless
filed for recordation with the FAA.
The Actual Notice Theory
Under this theory subsequent purchasers or creditors have pre-
vailed even in instances where prior interests have been recorded with
the FAA and the subsequent interest holders have failed to record.
The rationale in each case has been that the subsequent interest holder
had insufficient notice of prior intersts. It is important to under-
stand the shift in policy here. Cases decided under the constructive
notice theory view the purpose of federal recordation as protecting
prior interests, whereas cases decided under the actual notice theory
view recordation as a means of protecting subsequent interest holders.
Because the policy emphasis in these cases appears to be distinct from
that followed in Dowell, and since a number of the decisions based on
this theory contain dicta with respect to the applicability of state law
in determining questions of priority, these cases would not appear to
support the supreme court's conclusion in Dowell.
The parent case in which the actual notice theory was applied,
United States v. United Aircraft Corp.,68 was decided by a federal dis-
trict court in Connecticut. The government, as holder of recorded
chattel mortgages on two Douglas aircraft, sought to recover the en-
gines of the planes from the defendant who held the engines under
claim of a mechanic's lien for charges accrued in overhauling the en-
gines. The court held that the subsequent mechanic's lien would pre-
vail because the description in the mortgage, while it gave notice of
plaintiff's claim to the aircraft as a whole, was not sufficiently definite
to give notice of any claim to the engines. The court did not discuss
67. 143 So. 2d 657 (Fla. Ct. App. 1962).
68. 80 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1948).
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the issue of whether an artificer's lien can take priority over a re-
corded government lien.69  The reasoning applied in this case-actual
notice of the recorded secured interest is necessary to obtain any prefer-
ence over subsequently acquired interests in the aircraft-is distinct
from the validity theory in that defendant's interest did not fail auto-
matically for lack of recordation.
A federal district court in Michigan also applied the actual notice
theory in Aircraft Investment Corp. v. Pezzani & Reid Equipment
Co.70 In that case the defendant purchased the aircraft in Texas
from a retail dealer one day before the plaintiff finance company had
filed its chattel mortgage for recording with the FAA. The court de-
nied the finance company's motion for summary judgment, stating that
if the defendant purchaser could prove that there was no notice of the
plaintiffs mortgage until after it had been recorded, title passed free
of the mortgage to defendant when the purchase was completed and
the plane delivered.71 By way of dictum the court also indicated that
the defendant purchaser might be accorded priority by application of
the rules of conflicts of law under a Texas statute7 2 which makes void
under certain conditions any chattel mortgage on goods "daily exposed
for sale." 73  The Texas statute was similar to California Commercial
Code section 9307 in its design to protect the consumer against dis-
honest or insolvent retailers and to promote the free flow of com-
merce by encouraging purchasers to buy without fear that they may be
divested of their purchase. The Michigan federal district court in an
earlier case74 appeared to have relied on Uniform Commercial Code
section 9-307 in according priority to a subsequent purchaser without
notice. Had the Michigan district court been presented with the fact
situation in Dowell, its decision would have been contrary to that of
the California Supreme Court.
A North Carolina court, in a widely quoted opinion, also followed
the actual notice theory7" in Marsden v. Southern Flight Service, Inc.
7
1
69. Id. at 55: "We do not reach the question whether an artificer's lien can take
precedence over a valid government lien ......
70. 205 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
71. id. at 81.
72. Ch. 82, § 1, [1949] Tex. Acts 137 (repealed 1965).
73. 205 F. Supp. at 82.
74. Northern Ill. Corp. v. Bishop Distrib. Co., 284 F. Supp. 121 (W.D. Mich.
1968), discussed in text accompanying notes 87-89 infra.
75. Also following this theory is a Texas case, Continental Radio Co. v. Con-
tinental Bank and Trust Co., 369 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), in which the
plaintiff claimed a constitutional mechanic's lien on an aircraft subject to a subse-
quently acquired chattel mortgage held by the bank. Plaintiff had sent certain docu-
ments evidencing its claim to the FAA, but none of these instruments complied with
the statutory requirements for filing. Although the bank had not examined the records
of the FAA, the court ruled in its favor since such an examination would not have
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The plaintiff in Marsden purchased from a retailer an aircraft which
was subject to two chattel mortgages held by a bank. The plaintiff
purchaser neither searched title nor recorded his bill of sale with the
FAA. Some months after the sale, the retailer sought to repay the
bank through a new loan from the defendant finance company. The
retailer pledged, as security for the loan, the aircraft which had previ-
ously been sold to the plaintiff. The finance company searched the
records of the FAA and found nothing to indicate that the retailer did
not have good title to the aircraft. At the outset the plaintiff pur-
chaser contended that, as a purchaser in ordinary course of business,
he took free of the security interest. The court summarily dismissed
this contention, pointing out that the defendant finance company had
acquired its interest subsequent to the purchase of the aircraft by the
plaintiff. 77 The court concluded that the defendant finance company's
lien was superior, saying:
The purpose of the recording provisions of the act is to protect
persons who have dealt on the faith of recorded title or [sic] air-
craft and as to whom it would be a fraud to give effect to unre-
corded titles to their detriment.78
The scope of the Marsden decision appears to be quite narrow. The
court would protect those who have relied to their detriment on
recordation or its absence, but is otherwise silent on the question of
priorities. Although the court in Marsden emphasizes the importance
of recording it does so on the theory that recording is necessary to
disclosed plaintiffs lien. Thus, the bank had neither actual nor constructive notice of
plaintiff's lien and as a bona fide mortgagee was accorded the same protection ac-
corded in equity to an innocent purchaser with regard to constitutional mechanic's liens.
Blalock v. Brown, 78 Ga. App. 537, 51 S.E.2d 610 (1949), another case following
the actual notice theory involved a second purchaser who recorded with the FAA and
prevailed over a first purchaser who did not record, since the second purchaser had
neither constructive nor actual notice of the prior sale of the plane.
76. 227 F. Supp. 411 (M.D.N.C. 1964).
77. Id. at 416 n.6.
78. Id. at 415. But see Lochhead v. G.A.C. Fin. Corp., 6 Ariz. App. 539,
434 P.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1967), where the finance corporation, as assignee of a feder-
ally recorded conditional sales contract by the second purchaser, was not entitled to
summary judgment over the first purchaser even though the first purchaser failed to
record his interest with the FAA. The basis of this decision was that the lack of
possession in the second purchaser put into question the inherent validity of the condi-
tional sales contract under Arizona law. Since the case deals primarily with the
initial or inherent validity of the recorded instrument (see discussion of 49 U.S.C.
§ 1406 (1970) in text accompanying notes 14-18 supra) it may not properly be
categorized under any of the theories discussed in this section. The result in this case
can be squared with the result in Marsden by recognizing that Marsden did not entail
a determination of the inherent or initial validity of the recorded instruments. Thus,
the federal recording provisions may protect persons who have dealt on faith of a




protect those who may acquire subsequent interests in the aircraft.
Thus, the basis of the decision is distinct from that followed in the
cases decided -under the constructive notice theory where the empha-
sis was on the protection of first recorded interests.
In State Securities Company v. Aviation Enterprises, Inc.,7s a
case decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, a good faith pur-
chaser who had failed to record his title prevailed over the holder of a
chattel mortgage, also unrecorded, on the rationale that the purchaser
had no notice of the mortgagee's claim. Although the lack of re-
cording by both parties makes the categorization of the case under the
actual notice theory somewhat tenuous, the opinion contained dicta
which is pertinent to the subsequent discussion of Dowell:
By providing a federal system for registration of conveyances and
liens affecting the title to aircraft, Congress has preempted that
field and state recording statutes are not applicable to such title
instruments. However, questions of the validity of such title doc-
uments, actual notice, good faith purchaser status, and the like,
must be resolved under state law.80
The State Law Theory
The reasoning applied under this theory is that federal recording
would validate a title or incumbrance as against any claim of invalidity
based on the absence of state or local recording. Federal recording,
however, does not necessarily create an affirmative priority as against
any competing interests based on state law."' The courts following
this theory view the recording provisions of the Federal Aviation Act
as pre-emptive of state laws only with respect to time and place of
recording.82 Questions of priorities are decided with reference to state
law.
The leading case in this category, Texas National Bank v. Aufder-
heide,8 3 was decided by an Arkansas federal district court. The con-
troversy arose out of a sale by a Texas retail aircraft dealer of an air-
plane which was subject to a floor plan mortgage in favor of the
plaintiff bank. 84 The plaintiff bank had duly recorded the mortgage
with the FAA only after the controversy arose. At the time of pur-
79. 355 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1966).
80. Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
81. Southern Jersey Airways, Inc. v. National Bank, 108 NJ. Super. 369, 377,
261 A.2d 399, 404 (App. Div. 1970).
82. Northern Ill. Corp. v. Bishop Distrib. Co., 284 F. Supp. 121, 124 (W.D.
Mich. 1968).
83. 235 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Ark. 1964).
84. A floor plan mortgage entails the buying and financing of airplanes by a
finance company and placing them on the floor of the dealer, so that the dealer may
resell the aircraft to his retail trade. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 769 (4th ed. 1968).
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chase none of the individual defendant purchasers had made any search
of the records of the FAA. The bank contended that the recordation of
its mortgage made its lien superior to the claims of the defendants. The
district court, however, held for defendants and found the fact of re-
cordation was not controlling. The court stated:
[P]roper recordation can, and usually does, have a substantial
bearing on the validity of the instrument as to third persons, and
as to the priority to be accorded to that instrument with respect to
other claims or liens affecting the property involved ...
It does not follow, however, that section 1403 has repealed
or abolished the general rule of chattel mortgage law that when a
mortgagee consents to the sale of a mortgaged chattel free of lien
by the mortgagor, the purchaser takes free of the mortgage lien
and his rights are superior to those of the mortgagee. 85
The court specifically called attention to the fact that this reasoning
was consistent with section 9-307 of the Uniform Commercial Code.8 6
The Michigan federal district court appears to have followed
similar reasoning in Northern Illinois Corp. v. Bishop Distributing
Co.87 As in Aufderheide the purchaser bought an aircraft subject to
a prior mortgage, and the only apparent factual distinction in the
two cases is that the purchaser recorded the bill of sale with the FAA,
but still subsequent to the time the security agreement had been re-
corded. The court concluded that the purchaser's rights were not
solely dependent upon recording8 and that, under Commercial Code
section 9-307, the purchasers took free of the security interest. 89
Similarly, the Ohio court in Suburban Trust & Savings Bank v.
Campbell9" appears to have determined priorities of recorded interests
in accordance with the state law. Both parties in that case had filed
their respective interests for recordation with the FAA and the se-
curity holder's recordation was prior in time to that of the pur-
chaser. The court held for the defendant purchaser under section
9-307 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
The courts following what this note has termed the state law
theory do not allow the mere recording of the interest with the FAA
to frustrate state policy considerations embodied in local law. It is
important to note that, along with Dowell, these are the most recent
cases in point and may be indicative of a trend in other jurisdictions.
85. 235 F. Supp. at 603.
86. Id. at 604.
87. 284 F. Supp. 121 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
88. Id. at 124.
89. Id. at 125.
90. 19 Ohio Misc. 74, 250 N.E.2d 118 (C.P. 1969).
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Summary
The prior discussion has classified into four major categories the
decisions of the various jurisdictions which have been faced with the
inherent conflict between the federal recording statutes and state law
regarding priorities. The four categories are considered descriptive of
the reasoning applied by the courts in resolving this conflict. There
are cases, however, which do not readily fit into any particular category
and appear to be premised on combinations of the above theories.
For example, a recent New Jersey decision, Southern Jersey Airways
v. National Bank of Secaucus,91 which is possibly one of the better
reasoned cases dealing with the question of priorities in aircraft liens,
appears to combine both the actual notice theory and the state law
theory. The court held that an unrecorded subsequent mechanic's
lien prevailed over a prior security interest recorded with the FAA on
the basis of applicable state law which included Uniform Commercial
Code section 9-310. The opinion states quite clearly, however, that
had the plaintiff's mechanic's lien preceded the security interest and
remained unrecorded, it would not have been accorded priority.92
In other words, if the defendants had recorded their security interest
and had relied on the absence of any prior claim recorded with the
FAA, or because they had no actual notice of other outstanding inter-
ests, the state law regarding priority would not have been applied. In
this decision, of course, the court has assumed that the purpose of
the recording provisions of the Federal Aviation Act is to protect sub-
sequent, rather than prior interest holders. Thus, the case holding is
directly contrary to the holding in Dowell, not only from a policy
perspective, but in the court's application of the Uniform Commercial
Code to protect an unrecorded interest. The decision in Southern
Jersey Airways is preferable to the result reached by the California
Supreme Court in Dowell in that it allows the application of state law
where there are important questions of state policy, yet does not permit
state policies to override a good faith reliance on the records of the
FAA. This approach encourages, rather than discourages, the recorda-
tion of interests in aircraft since the holder of a mechanic's lien or a
purchaser in the ordinary course of business who, like the plaintiff in
Dowell, failed to record his lien or bill of sale would risk the subordi-
nation of his interest to those of subsequent lienors.
Priorities Given Aircraft Liens-California
As the preceding discussion indicates, the courts of various juris-
dictions have differed widely over the question of the relationship be-
91. 108 N.J. Super. 369, 261 A.2d 399 (App. Div. 1970).
92. Id. at 390-91, 261 A.2d at 411.
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tween the federal recording system and state priorities. The California
cases discussed by the California Supreme Court in the Dowell deci-
sion have also applied various interpretations as to the effect of the
federal recording statutes on the state law. For example, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court cites as persuasive precedent Pope v. National Aero
Finance Co. 93  In this case the plaintiffs contended they had acquired
an interest in an airplane which was subject to a chattel mortgage
held by the defendant finance company. Although the court of ap-
peal did not feel plaintiffs had, in fact, acquired any interest in the
plane, it assumed, for purposes of argument, the plaintiff had acquired
such an interest on January 31, 1960-two days before the security
interest of the defendant finance company was recorded with the FAA.
The court noted, however, that plaintiffs at no time had attempted to
record their alleged interest, and that some two months after the
plaintiffs supposedly acquired their interest in the plane the defendant
finance company had refinanced the plane for the registered title hold-
ers of the airplane. The fact that the defendant finance company re-
financed the airplane subsequent to the time that plaintiffs had first
alleged an interest in the aircraft was found to be of crucial signifi-
cance by the court since it established the element of reliance by the
financing company.
Although the Pope decision is beclouded by the usual allusions to
pre-emption of state law by the federal recording statute,94 the under-
lying rationale of the case is clearly the actual notice theory as previ-
ously expressed by the North Carolina court in Marsden,95 as shown
by the following statement by the California court:
Examining the respective rights of the parties on the present hy-
pothesis, we conclude that it would be violative of the purpose of
the federal act to permit plaintiffs, who did nothing to comply
with its registration and recordation provisions, to prevail over
[the defendant finance company] which lent money on the strength
of the record title . . . and recorded its mortgage with the
federal agency. 96
The quoted language is remarkably similar to the language in
Marsden, and may be said to support the proposition that the re-
cording statutes will protect subsequent interest holders who have
taken their interest in reliance on the records of the FAA. Both
Marsden and Pope, however, appear to lend no support to the deci-
sion of the supreme court in Dowell, where the recorded interest was
93. 236 Cal. App. 2d 722, 46 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1965).
94. Id. at 733, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
95. 227 F. Supp. 411 (M.D.N.C. 1964), discussed in text accompanying notes
76-78 supra.
96. 236 Cal. App. 2d at 734-35, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
97. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
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prior in time and taken without reliance on the plaintiff's failure to
record.
In Dowell, the California Supreme Court remarked of the Pope
decision that "the court looked to the federal law and determined that
the policy underlying the recordation system precluded judgment for
plaintiffs .... -98 The supreme court appears to have assumed that
the policy enunciated in Dowell and the policy underlying Pope are
the same. This assumption appears erroneous, however, when the
fact of the finance company's reliance on the records of the FAA is
placed in its proper perspective. Thus, it may be argued that the
policy basis in Pope is the protection of subsequent interest holders
and is distinct from the policy basis of Dowell-the protection of prior
recorded interests.
Another California case which looms large in the Dowell decision,
International Atlas Services, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Aircraft,99 may
be classified under the validity theory previously discussed. Atlas in-
volved the question of conflicting claims of title to aircraft engines.
The defendant held title in the entire plane by virtue of a conditional
sales contract which had been recorded with the FAA. The plaintiff
failed to record with the FAA its title to newly overhauled engines
which had been installed in the plane subsequent to the recording of
the conditional sales contract. Under California law, the plaintiff was
entitled to recover, as a minimum, the value of its engines and, pos-
sibly, even the engines themselves. The court of appeal declined to
apply California law, however, stating that it had been superseded
by federal law with respect to aircraft:
[The plaintiff] could have fully protected its rights in these en-
gines and preserved a good title . ..by ... recording its interest
in specifically numbered aircraft engines with the Federal Avia-
tion Agency. Its failure to record . ..resulted in the subordina-
tion of its interest in the engines to the recorded interest of
Twentieth Century in the aircraft as a whole. The latter, by re-
cording with the Federal Aviation Authority, established a superior
right to the aircraft, its engines, and its propellers, effective
against all other interests in the aircraft except known or re-
corded adverse interests.100
The decision in Atlas makes it clear that, had the plaintiff re-
98. 3 Cal. 3d at 549, 476 P.2d at 404, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
99. 251 Cal. App. 2d 434, 59 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1038
(1968).
100. Id. at 440-41, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 498-99 (emphasis added). But see Southern
Jersey Airways, Inc. v. National Bank, 108 NJ. Super. 369, 388, 261 A.2d 399;
410 (App. Div. 1970): "What is unjustifiable about the decision [in Atlas] is its
holding of forfeiture of the owner's title interest because of absence of recording in a
situation where the prevailing prior-in-time conditional vendor obviously did not take
its security interest in reliance upon the absence from record of the then nonexistent
leases of the engines."
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corded the interest in the engines with the FAA the interest would
have prevailed against the defendant's prior recorded interest. Atlas
thus lends no support to the decision in Dowell which is based on the
thesis that priority in federal recording assures priority as to subse-
quent interests, irrespective of state law. Thus, Atlas comes within the
validity theory because the unrecorded documents were held to be in-
valid as to third persons-whether such third persons acquire their in-
terest prior or subsequent to the recorded interest. In Dowell the
California Supreme Court cites Atlas together with Pope as "suggest-
ing that prior recorded security interests under Federal law should
take precedence over subsequent purchasers. " 101 Yet, it would appear
that the specific holding of Atlas is more limited in scope since in Atlas
the subsequent interest holder would have prevailed had such interest
been recorded. In other words, state law and not federal law would
have determined the respective priorities between two recorded inter-
ests. Had the basis of the decision in Dowell been the plaintiffs fail-
ure to record, Atlas might arguably be said to support the conclusion
reached by the California Supreme Court. The holding in Dowell,
however, is based on the much broader proposition that the purpose of
the federal statutes is the protection of prior recorded interests. Since
the court in Atlas would not necessarily have protected the first re-
corded interest in a different fact situation, Atlas cannot be said to
support this proposition.
In the Dowell decision the court places great emphasis on the
plaintiff's failure to search title;10 2 the failure of the plaintiff to re-
cord his interest assumes only secondary importance. A closer read-
ing of Atlas raises the question of who would have prevailed if the
plaintiff in Dowell had failed to search title but had recorded his bill
of sale with the FAA. Atlas indicates that in this situation state law
would have accorded priority to the purchaser. The implication of the
Dowell decision is exactly contrary-that by virtue of the federal law,
the first recorded interest will prevail:
The federal policy to foster recordation and to protect recorded
interests is eviscerated by a rule which relies on state laws to
protect the buyer in the ordinary course of business even though
he fails to undertake a simple title search which would have read-
ily revealed all encumbrances. 10 3
Since Dowell places little or no emphasis on the plaintiffs fail-
ure to record, the decision may be distinguished from cases which
have been categorized under the validity theory in which the failure to
record was the determinative factor in the disposition of the case.
101. 3 Cal. 3d at 551, 476 P.2d at 405, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
102. Id. at 549, 552, 476 P.2d at 404, 406, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 4, 6.
103. Id. at 552, 476 P.2d at 406, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 6 (emphasis added).
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Crescent City Aviation, Inc. v. Beverly Bank,10 4 Smith v. Eastern Air-
motive Corp.,105 and James Talcott, Inc. v. Bank of Miami Beach'0 6
are three of the older cases cited by the California Supreme Court as
"adopting a view as to priorities based upon the federal recordation
provisions."' ° While this statement is not inaccurate, it is misleading.
As has already been discussed, a more precise description of the
cases would be that they adopt a view which results in priority of fed-
erally recorded interests over unrecorded claims on the rationale that
unrecorded liens are invalid as to third parties without notice. These
cases, like Atlas, do not support the broader policy enunciated in
Dowell-that the primary purpose of the federal statutes is the pro-
tection of prior recorded interests.
Any support these cases afford the court in Dowell is tenuous
and is further undermined by what appears to be a recent trend away
from the validity theory. One of the leading cases under the valid-
ity theory, Smith, was overruled in Southern Jersey Airways v. Na-
tional Bank of Secaucus, °8 some eleven months prior to Dowell; however,
the California court cited only Smith in its decision. Also, Southern
Jersey and the more recent decisions on this question have applied
state law to the determination of priorities. 09 In neither of these
cases does it appear that failure to record would have automatically
defeated a party's interest in an aircraft.
When compared to the decisions of other jurisdictions Dowell
will be seen to align itself with the older cases categorized under the
constructive notice theory. Dowell relies heavily on In re Veterans'
Express" and Dawson v. General Discount Corp."' and both of
these cases offer ample support for the reasoning of the California
Supreme Court. Nonetheless, it should be noted that these cases were
decided in 1948 and 1950 respectively, at a time when state and fed-
eral policies for the protection of the consumer were not, as today, in
the forefront of judicial scrutiny.
104. 139 Ind. App. 669, 219 N.E.2d 446 (1966), discussed at text accompanying
notes 60-61 supra.
105. 99 NJ. Super. 340, 240 A.2d 17 (Ch. 1968), discussed in text accompanying
notes 62-66 supra.
106. 143 So. 2d 657 (Fla. Ct. App. 1962), discussed in text accompanying
note 67 supra.
107. 3 Cal. 3d at 551, 476 P.2d at 405, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
108. 108 NJ. Super. 369, 391, 261 A.2d 399, 411 (App. Div. 1970).
109. Suburban Trust & Savings Bank v. Campbell, 19 Ohio Misc. 74, 250 N.E.2d
118 (C.P. 1969); United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. WTAE Flying Club,
300 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
110. 76 F. Supp. 684 (D.NJ. 1948), discussed in text accompanying notes
45-51 supra.
111. 82 Ga. App. 29, 60 S.E.2d 653 (1950), discussed in text accompanying
notes 56-57 supra.
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Conclusion
In summary, the cases categorized under the constructive notice
theory support the decision in Dowell. The cases categorized under
the validity theory would lend some support to Dowell if the basis of
the California court's decision had been the plaintiff's failure to re-
cord. However, since the emphasis in Dowell was not on the plain-
tiff's failure to record, but was instead on the plaintiff's failure to
search title-which implies a policy for the protection of prior re-
corded interests-the cases under the validity theory do not support
the conclusion reached in Dowell. Since the opinions categorized un-
der the actual notice theory abound in dicta with respect to the
applicability of state law in determining questions of priority, and since
the policy of these cases is the protection of subsequent rather than
prior interests, these cases appear to lend little or no support for the
decision in Dowell. Cases categorized above under the state law the-
ory clearly are contrary to the holding in Dowell.
Thus the conclusion of the court in Dowell appears largely un-
supported by either prior case law or the legislative history underlying
the federal recording provisions. Dowell might be justified in terms of
a judicial policy favoring the aircraft financing industry and other such
prior recorded interests in aircraft. The overriding issue remains,
however, as to the desirability of such a judicial policy to the detriment
of the policy embodied in section 9307 of the California Commercial
Code aimed at protecting the interests of purchasers of goods in the
market place.
The decision in Dowell has contributed to a growing confusion as
to the effect of the federal recording provisions on the priorities ac-
corded under state law. The present state of the law can lead to
anomalous situations in that, in New Jersey, a subsequent purchaser
in the ordinary course of business will in all probability take free and
clear of a security interest in the aircraft which has been previously
recorded with the FAA. Should the same individual decide per-
chance to make his purchase in California and fail to search the rec-
ords of the FAA, he risks the loss of his plane to the secured interest
holder. Hopefully, this conflict will soon be resolved by appropriate
congressional legislation.
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